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TAX COMPETITION, TAX ARBITRAGE, AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 
 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1
 
 
 
 
In the past ten years, I have argued repeatedly that a coherent 
international tax regime exists, embodied in both the tax treaty 
network and in domestic laws, and that it forms a significant part of 
international law (both treaty-based and customary). The practical 
implication is that countries are not free to adopt any international tax 
rules they please, but rather operate in the context of the regime, 
which changes in the same ways international law changes over time. 
Thus, unilateral action is possible, but is also restricted, and countries 
are generally reluctant to take unilateral actions that violate the basic 
norms that underlie the regime. Those norms are the single tax 
principle (i.e., that income should be taxed once- not more and not 
less) and the benefits principle (i.e., that active business income 
should be taxed primarily at source, and passive investment income 
primarily at residence). 
 
This thesis is quite controversial. Several prominent international tax 
academics and practitioners in the US (e.g., Michael Graetz, David 
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Rosenbloom, Julie Roin, Mitchell Kane) and elsewhere (e.g., Tsilly 
Dagan) have advocated the view that there is no international tax 
regime and that countries are free to adopt any tax rules they believe 
further their own interests (Graetz, 2001; Rosenbloom, 2006, 2000; 
Roin, 2002; Dagan, 2000; Kane, 2005). Other prominent tax 
academics (e.g., Hugh Ault, Yariv Brauner, Paul McDaniel, Diane Ring, 
Richard Vann) and practitioners (e.g., Luca dell'Anese, Shay Menuchin, 
Philip West) have supported the view advocated above (dell'Anese, 
2006; Ring 2005; Menuchin 2004; Ault, 2002; McDaniel, 2001; Vann, 
2003; West, 1996). However, there is no coherent exposition of this 
view in the academic or practical literature. This article is intended to 
fill this gap, following up on previous articles in which I developed the 
above thesis (e.g., Avi-Yonah, 1996, 1997, 2000). 
 
The article is divided into four parts. Part 1 argues that an 
international tax regime exists, embodied both in the tax treaty 
network and in the domestic tax laws of the major trading nations. 
Illustrations are provided from recent developments that show 
countries like the US and Germany complying with basic norms of the 
regime, such as non-discrimination. Part 2 argues that the 
international tax regime is an important part of international law, as it 
evolved in the 20th century. In particular, the article argues that parts 
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of international tax law can be seen as customary international law 
and therefore as binding even in the absence of treaties. An example 
would be the arm’s length standard under transfer pricing. Part 3 of 
the article explains the basic structure of the international tax regime 
and its underlying norms, the single tax principle (income should be 
taxed once, no more and no less) and the benefits principle (active 
business income should be taxed primarily at source, passive 
investment income primarily at residence). Part 3 further sets out the 
normative rationale for these norms. Part 4 of the article then 
discusses recent challenges to the international tax regime such as tax 
competition and tax arbitrage, and argues that the reaction to these 
challenges by the OECD, the WTO, the EU, and specific tax 
administrations prove the existence of the international tax regime.    
 
1. Is There an International Tax Regime?2 
 
The most important statement denying the existence of the 
international tax regime was the 1998 Tillinghast Lecture delivered by 
H. David Rosenbloom at the NYU law school (Rosenbloom, 2000). 
Rosenbloom began his lecture by quoting from the legislative history 
of the US dual consolidated loss rules a statement referring to an 
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"international tax system."  He then proceeded to deny the existence 
of this system or regime ("that system appears to be imaginary"), 
because in the real world, only the different tax laws of various 
countries exist, and those laws vary greatly from each other.   
 
Of course, this description is true as far as it goes, but is this the 
whole truth? As Rosenbloom noted, in fact, there has been a 
remarkable degree of convergence even in the purely domestic tax 
laws of developed countries.  Not only can tax lawyers talk to each 
other across national boundaries and understand what each is saying 
(the terminology is the same), but the need to face similar problems in 
taxing income has led jurisdictions with different starting points to 
reach quite similar results. For example, countries that started off with 
global tax systems (i.e., tax “all income from whatever source derived” 
in the same way) now have incorporated schedular elements (for 
example, the capital loss and passive activity loss rules in the United 
States), whereas countries with a schedular background (i.e., tax 
different types of income differently) have largely adopted schedules 
for "other income" that lead to a global tax base (for example, the 
U.K.).   
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   Not surprisingly, this convergence is most advanced in international 
tax matters, because in this case the tax laws of various jurisdictions 
actually interact with each other, and one can document cases of 
direct influence. For example, every developed country now tends to 
tax currently passive income earned by its residents overseas (through 
controlled foreign corporations and foreign investmeent funds (FIF) 
rules, which were inspired by the U.S. example), and to exempt or 
defer active business income. Thus, the distinction between countries 
that assert worldwide taxing jurisdiction and those that only tax 
territorially has lost much of its force.  We will develop other examples 
of such convergence in the course of the article. 
 
   The claim that an international tax regime exists, however, rests 
mainly on the bilateral tax treaty network, which, as Rosenbloom 
stated, is "a triumph of international law."  The treaties are of course 
remarkably similar (even to the order of the articles), being based on 
the same OECD and UN models. In most countries, the treaties have a 
higher status than domestic law, and thus constrain domestic tax 
jurisdiction; and even in the United States, the treaties typically 
override contrary domestic law.  This means that in international tax 
matters, countries typically are bound by treaty to behave in certain 
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ways (for example, not tax a foreign seller who has no permanent 
establishment), and cannot enact legislation to the contrary. 
 
   I would argue that the network of 2,000 or more bilateral tax 
treaties that are largely similar in policy, and even in language, 
constitutes an international tax regime, which has definable principles 
that underlie it and are common to the treaties. These principles are 
the single tax principle and the benefits principle, which will be 
articulated further below.  In brief, the single tax principle states that 
income from cross-border transactions should be subject to tax once 
(that is, not more but also not less than once), at the rate determined 
by the benefits principle. The benefits principle allocates the right to 
tax active business income primarily to the source jurisdiction and the 
right to tax passive investment income primarily to the residence 
jurisdiction.  
 
   To those who doubt the existence of the international tax regime, let 
me pose the following question: Suppose you were advising a 
developing country or transition economy that wanted to adopt an 
income tax for the first time. How free do you think you would be to 
write the international tax rules for such a country in any way you 
wanted, assuming that it wished to attract foreign investment? I would 
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argue that the freedom of most countries to adopt international tax 
rules is severely constrained, even before entering into any tax 
treaties, by the need to adapt to generally accepted principles of 
international taxation. Even if divergent rules have been adopted, the 
process of integration into the world economy forces change. For 
example, Mexico had to abandon its long tradition of applying formulas 
in transfer pricing and adopt rules modeled after the OECD guidelines 
in order to be able to join the OECD.  South Korea similarly had to 
change its broad interpretation of what constitutes a permanent 
establishment under pressure from the OECD.  And Bolivia had to 
abandon its attempt to adopt a cash flow corporate tax because it was 
ruled not creditable in the United States.  Even the United States is not 
immune to this type of pressure to conform, as can be seen if one 
compares the 1993 proposed transfer pricing regulations under IRC 
section 482, which led to an international uproar, with the final 
regulations, which reflect the OECD guidelines.   
 
Another illustration can be derived from recent developments in both 
the US and Germany regarding the application of the principle of non-
discrimination, which is embodied in all the tax treaties, to thin 
capitalization rules that are designed to prevent foreign taxpayers 
from eliminating the corporate tax base through capitalizing domestic 
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subsidiary corporations principally with debt. When the US first 
adopted its thin capitalization rule in 1989, it carefully applied it both 
to foreigners and to domestic tax exempts, so as not to appear to be 
denying interest deductions only to foreigners. The US did this even 
though thin capitalization rules are an accepted part of international 
tax law and even though its constitutional law permits unilateral 
overrides of tax treaties. The Germans adopted the same rule, but 
when it was nevertheless struck down as discriminatory by the 
European Court of Justice in 2002, they responded by applying thin 
capitalization to all domestic as well as foreign taxpayers. Neither the 
US nor the German actions are understandable in the absence of an 
international tax regime embodying the principle of non-discrimination. 
 
2. Is the International Tax Regime Part of International 
Law?3 
 
Few would dispute that the network of bilateral tax treaties forms an 
important part of international law. Thus, the key issue is whether 
these treaties and the domestic tax laws of various jurisdictions can be 
said to form an international tax regime that is part of customary 
international law. 
                                                 
3 This part is based on Avi-Yonah (2004). 
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 Customary international law is law that “results from a general and 
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal 
obligation.” Rest. 3rd (For. Rel.) sec. 102(2). “International agreements 
create law for states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of 
customary international law when such agreements are intended for 
adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted.” Rest. 
3rd (For. Rel.) sec. 102(3). 
 
There clearly are international tax practices that are widely followed, 
such as for example avoiding double taxation by granting an 
exemption for foreign source income or a credit for foreign taxes. 
Moreover, there are over 2,000 bilateral tax treaties in existence, and 
they all follow one of two widely accepted models (the OECD and UN 
model treaties), which themselves are quite similar to each other and 
are “intended for adherence by states generally.” Is this enough to 
create a customary international tax law? 
 
In the following, I will briefly survey some examples that in my opinion 
strengthen the view that the international tax regime rises to the level 
of customary international law. As usual, the hard question is whether 
 9
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countries not only follow a rule, but do so out of a sense of legal 
obligation (opinio juris).   
  
a. Jurisdiction to Tax. 
 
Can a country simply decide to tax non-residents that have no 
connection to it on foreign source income? The answer is clearly no, 
both from a practical perspective and, I would argue, from a 
customary international law perspective. The fact that this rule is 
followed from a sense of legal obligation is illustrated by the behavior 
of the US in adopting the FPHC and CFC rules. In the case of 
corporations controlled by US residents, the US does not tax those 
corporations directly, but rather taxes the US resident shareholders on 
imaginary (deemed) dividends distributed to the shareholders. This 
deemed dividend rule was adopted precisely because the US felt bound 
by a customary international law rule not to tax non-residents directly 
on foreign source income, even though they are controlled by 
residents. The US no longer feels bound by this rule, but that is 
because enough other countries have adopted CFC legislation that 
expands the definition of nationality that customary international law 
has changed. The spread of CFC legislation from 1962 onward is a 
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good example of how rapidly customary international law can in fact 
change. 
  
b. Non-discrimination. 
 
The non-discrimination norm (i.e., that non-residents from a treaty 
country should not be treated worse than residents) is embodied in all 
tax treaties. But is it part of customary international law? The behavior 
of the US in the earnings stripping episode described above suggests 
that the US felt at the time that the non-discrimination norm was 
binding even outside the treaty context. Otherwise, even if it did not 
wish to override treaties, it could have applied a different rule to non-
treaty country residents (as it did in the branch profits tax context 
three years earlier). Thus, I would argue that the non-discrimination 
norm may in fact be part of customary international law even in the 
absence of a treaty.   
  
c. The Arm’s Length Standard. 
 
The standard applied in all tax treaties to the transfer pricing problem 
of determining the proper allocation of profits between related entities 
is the “arm’s length standard”, which means that transactions between 
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related parties may be adjusted by the tax authorities to the terms 
that would have been negotiated had the parties been unrelated to 
each other. This standard has been the governing rule since the 
1930s. 
 
In the 1980s, the US realized that in many circumstances it is very 
difficult to find comparable transactions between unrelated parties on 
which to base the arm’s length determination. It therefore began the 
process of revising the regulations that govern transfer pricing. This 
culminated in 1995 with the adoption of two new methods, the 
comparable profit method and profit split method, that rely much less 
on finding comparables (and in the case of profit split sometimes 
require no comparables at all). 
 
What is remarkable about the process by which these regulations were 
adopted is the US insistence throughout that what it was doing was 
consistent with the arm’s length standard. It even initially called profit 
split the “basic arm’s length return method.” But as I have pointed out 
elsewhere, once you abandon the search for comparables, it is 
meaningless to call a method “arm’s length”, because without 
comparables nobody can know what unrelated parties would have 
done (Avi-Yonah, 1995). 
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 Nevertheless, despite initial objections, the OECD ultimately came to 
accept the gist of the new methods in its revised transfer pricing 
guidelines, which were issued a short time after the new US 
regulations and represent the widely followed consensus view of 
transfer pricing. The new methods are thus accepted under the rubric 
of “arm’s length”.  
 
As Brian Leppard has suggested, the US insistence that it was 
following the arm’s length standard indicates that it felt that the 
standard is part of customary international law (Leppard, 1998). Such 
a finding has important implications because the US states explicitly 
follow a non-arm’s length method, formulary apportionment, which 
has been twice upheld by the US Supreme Court. If the arm’s length 
method is customary international law, these cases may have been 
wrongly decided, as customary international law is part of federal law 
and arguably preempts contrary state law.   
 
d. Foreign Tax Credits vs. Deductions. 
 
Many economists argue that countries should only give a deduction for 
foreign taxes rather than a credit. However, countries generally grant 
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either an exemption for foreign source income or a credit for foreign 
taxes paid. Remarkably, in most cases (following the lead of the US) 
this is done even in the absence of a treaty. It is likely that at this 
point countries consider themselves in practice bound by the credit or 
exemption norm, and a country would feel highly reluctant to switch to 
a deduction method instead. Thus, arguably preventing double 
taxation through a credit or exemption has become part of customary 
international law. 
  
e. Conclusion. 
 
If customary international tax law exists, this has important 
implications for the US and other countries. As Justice Gray wrote over 
100 years ago in the Paquete Habana case, “[I]nternational law is part 
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of 
justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this 
purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or 
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs 
and usages of civilized nations.” 175 US 677, 700 (1900). To the 
extent legislation exists, it can in the US override customary 
international law as well as treaties. But in the absence of treaties or 
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legislation, resort can be had to customary international law; and I 
would argue that it can also be used to ascertain the underlying 
purposes of treaties. 
 
To the extent that customary international tax law exists, this suggests 
that it is a mistake to deny the existence of an international tax 
system or regime. Admittedly, even if an international tax regime 
exists, it does not follow what we should do about it- this has to be 
investigated in each particular case. But we should not pretend that 
there are no binding, widely accepted international tax norms that we 
should flout only when significant national interests are at stake.  This 
view has important implications whenever differences between 
countries’ domestic laws lead to the possibility of tax arbitrage, which 
will be discussed further below. 
 
3. The Structure of the International Tax Regime.4  
 
If an international tax regime exists, what does it look like? The 
following sections will first define the two basic principles which in my 
view underlie the international tax regime and why they are 
normatively justified.  
                                                 
4 This part is based on Avi-Yonah (1997). 
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   a. Defining the Tax Base: The Single Tax Principle 
  
International income taxation involves two basic questions: 1. What is 
the appropriate level of taxation that should be levied on income from 
cross-border transactions? 2. How are the resulting revenues to be 
divided among taxing jurisdictions?  
 
The answer to the first question is the Single Tax Principle: Income 
from cross-border transactions should be subject to tax once (that is, 
neither more nor less than once). The Single Tax Principle thus 
incorporates the traditional goal of avoiding double taxation, which 
was the main motive for setting up the international tax regime in the 
1920's and 1930's.  Taxing cross- border income once also means, 
however, that it should not be undertaxed or (at the extreme) be 
subject to no tax at all. 
 
   The appropriate rate of tax for purposes of the Single Tax Principle is 
determined by the second principle of international taxation, the 
Benefits Principle. The Benefits Principle, discussed below, assigns the 
primary right to tax active business income to source jurisdictions and 
the primary right to tax passive income to residence jurisdictions. 
 16
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Therefore, the rate of tax for purposes of the Single Tax Principle is 
generally the source rate for active business income and the residence 
rate for passive (investment) income. When the primary jurisdiction 
refrains from taxation, however, residual taxation by other (residence 
or source) jurisdictions is possible, and may be necessary to prevent 
undertaxation.  Such residual taxation means that all income from 
cross-border transactions, under the Single Tax Principle, should be 
taxed at least at the source rate (which tends to be lower than the 
residence rate), but at no more than the residence rate.   
 
   What is the normative basis for the Single Tax Principle? As an initial 
matter, I assume that most countries would like to maintain both a 
personal income tax and a corporate income tax. The reasons for 
having both a personal income tax and a corporate income tax have 
been discussed extensively elsewhere, and are not repeated here (see, 
e.g., Avi-Yonah 2002, 2004).   For purposes of justifying the Single 
Tax Principle, it is sufficient that most countries in fact maintain their 
existing personal and corporate income taxes.   
 
   Given a preference for imposing both a personal and a corporate 
income tax on domestically derived income of individuals and 
corporations, it becomes relatively easy to establish why the Single 
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Tax Principle is justified as a goal of the international tax regime, on 
both theoretical and practical grounds. From a theoretical perspective, 
if income derived from cross-border transactions is taxed more heavily 
than domestic income, the added tax burden creates an inefficient 
incentive to invest domestically. This proposition is widely accepted 
and underlies the effort, which by now is about a century old, to 
prevent or alleviate international multiple taxation. 
 
   The corollary also holds true: If income from cross-border 
transactions is taxed less heavily than domestic income, this creates 
an inefficient incentive to invest internationally rather than at home. 
The deadweight loss from undertaxation is the same as that from 
overtaxation.   
 
   In addition, there is also a strong equity argument against 
undertaxation of cross-border income, which applies to income earned 
by individuals. From an equity perspective, undertaxation of cross-
border income violates both horizontal and vertical equity when 
compared to higher tax rates imposed on domestic source income, and 
in particular on domestic labor income. In this case, the argument that 
equity violations tend to turn into efficiency issues does not hold,   
because labor is less mobile than capital and wage earners typically do 
 18
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not have the ability to transform their domestic wages into foreign 
source income. 
 
   On a practical level, the Single Tax Principle can be justified because 
double taxation leads to tax rates that can be extremely high and tend 
to stifle international investment. Zero taxation, on the other hand, 
offers an opportunity to avoid domestic taxation by investing abroad, 
and therefore threatens to erode the national tax base. T.S. Adams, 
the architect of the foreign tax credit and a major influence in shaping 
the international tax regime, recognized both of these propositions in 
the 1920's. In justifying the foreign tax credit, Adams wrote "the state 
which with a fine regard for the rights of the taxpayer takes pains to 
relieve double taxation, may fairly take measures to ensure that the 
person or property pays at least one tax."  Contrary to an exemption 
system, Adams' credit operated to eliminate double taxation by both 
source and residence jurisdictions, but preserved residual residence-
based jurisdiction to enforce the Single Tax Principle (Graetz and 
O’Hear, 1997). 
 
   The practical justification for the Single Tax Principle can be seen 
most easily if one imagines a world with only two countries, A and B, 
and only two companies, X (a resident of A) and Y (a resident of B). If 
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both A and B tax the foreign source income of their residents and 
domestic source income of foreigners, and neither gives relief from 
double taxation, then both X and Y would minimize their taxes by only 
deriving domestic source income (since any foreign tax would by 
definition be an added burden).  The result would be adequate 
revenues collected by both A and B, but no cross-border trade or 
investment. 
 
   On the other hand, suppose both A and B exempted from tax both 
foreign source income and domestic source income of foreigners (a not 
inconceivable proposition in many developing countries, which tax 
residents territorially and grant tax holidays to foreign investors).  In 
that case, the way for both X and Y to minimize their taxes would be 
to derive their entire income from cross-border transactions. The 
result would be adequate cross-border trade, but no revenues for A or  
B. In a world in which international trade and investment are 
important, but taxes (unlike tariffs) cannot be reduced to zero, the 
Single Tax Principle is the best option. 
 
   b. Dividing the Tax Base: The Benefits Principle 
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Having defined one goal of the international tax regime as taxing 
cross-border income once, the next question is how to divide that base 
among the various jurisdictions laying claim to it. The Benefits 
Principle states that the residence jurisdiction has the primary right to 
tax passive (investment) income, while the source jurisdiction has the 
primary right to tax active (business) income. As explained above, this 
division also determines the appropriate rate of tax for purposes of the 
Single Tax Principle.   
 
   This distinction, which stems from the work of the League of Nations 
in the 1920s, also can be justified on both theoretical and pragmatic 
grounds. On a theoretical level, the Benefits Principle makes sense 
because it is primarily individuals who earn investment income, 
whereas it is primarily corporations that earn business income. In the 
case of individuals, residence-based taxation makes sense. First, 
residence is relatively easy to define in the case of individuals. Second, 
because most individuals are part of only one society, distributive 
concerns can be addressed most effectively in the country of 
residence. Third, residence overlaps with political allegiance, and in 
democratic countries, residence taxation is a proxy for taxation with 
representation.   
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   In the case of multinational corporations, source-based taxation 
seems generally preferable. First, the grounds for taxing individuals on 
a residence basis do not apply to corporations. The residence of 
corporations is difficult to establish and relatively meaningless. 
Residence based on place of incorporation is formalistic and subject to 
the control of the taxpayer, while residence based on management 
and control also can be manipulated. Moreover, multinationals are not 
part of a single society and their income does not belong to any 
particular society for distributive purposes. Finally, multinationals can 
exert significant political influence in jurisdictions other than the 
residence jurisdiction of their parent company, and therefore the 
concern about taxing foreigners who lack the ability to vote is less 
applicable to them. 
 
   Second, source-based taxation is consistent with a benefits 
perspective on justifying tax jurisdiction. Source jurisdictions provide 
significant benefits to corporations that carry on business activities 
within them. Such benefits include the provision of infrastructure or 
education, as well as more specific government policies such as 
keeping the exchange rate stable or interest rates low. These benefits 
justify source-based corporate taxation in the sense that the host 
country's government bears some of the costs of providing the 
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benefits that are necessary for earning the income. As T.S. Adams 
wrote in 1917, "A large part of the cost of government is traceable to 
the necessity of maintaining a suitable business environment."  These 
costs justify imposing a tax as compensation to the government 
bearing them.   
 
   On a more pragmatic level, as Adams also observed, since the 
source jurisdiction has by definition the "first bite at the apple," that is, 
it has the first opportunity to collect the tax on payments derived from 
within its borders, it would be extremely difficult to prevent source 
jurisdictions from imposing the tax. "Every state insists upon taxing 
the non-resident alien who derives income from source [sic] within 
that country, and rightly so, at least inevitably so."  Thus, as Michael 
Graetz and Michael O’Hear observe, even if economists tend to prefer 
pure residence-based taxation, this recommendation is unlikely to be 
followed in practice (Graetz and O’Hear, 1997).  This is particularly the 
case for business income derived from large markets, in which case 
there is little fear that the foreign investor will abandon the market 
because of source-based taxation. For portfolio investment, however, 
even large source countries like the United States have tended to 
abandon it for fear of driving away mobile capital.  Thus, business 
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income is a better candidate for source-based taxation than 
investment income. 
 
   The division between active (mostly corporate) and passive (mostly 
individual) income also makes sense because it is congruent with the 
Single Tax Principle, since most of the rate divergence among taxing 
jurisdictions arises in the individual income tax, while corporate tax 
rates have tended to converge. The top marginal personal income tax 
rate among OECD member countries varied in 2006 from 7.5% 
(Switzerland) to 53.8% (Germany).  This variability is acceptable for 
purposes of the Single Tax Principle, because under the Benefits 
Principle most income earned by individuals in cross-border 
transactions is investment income that generally is subject only to 
residence country tax. Therefore, the residence country rate typically 
determines the single tax rate for investment income.   
 
   Corporate tax rates, on the other hand, do not vary so widely (and 
also tend to be flat, rather than progressive). Among OECD member 
countries, in 2006 the corporate tax rate ranged from 8.5% 
(Switzerland) to 35% (United States), but 22 out of 30 member 
countries had rates in the 25% to 35% range.  Thus, for purposes of 
the Single Tax Principle, the rate applied is generally the residence 
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rate for individual (mostly investment) income and a rate in the 25-
35% range for corporate (mostly business) income. It is congruent 
with both the Single Tax and Benefits Principles, however, to have 
residual taxation by residence or source jurisdictions in cases where 
the jurisdiction that has the primary right to tax under the Benefits 
Principle refrains from doing so. Thus, under the Single Tax and 
Benefits Principles, all income from cross-border taxation under 
current rate structures should be taxed at a rate between 
approximately 25% (the lower end of the source rates) and 
approximately 55% (the higher end of the residence rates). 
 
   Neither the Single Tax Principle nor the Benefits Principle provides a 
clear answer to the question of how to divide the corporate income tax 
base among the various jurisdictions providing benefits. Market prices 
can provide an answer when transactions are at arm's length, but not 
when they are between related parties (and there are no comparable 
arm's length transactions).  In addition, the Single Tax Principle 
requires that taxation be imposed even on income derived from a 
jurisdiction that chooses not to levy a tax in return for the benefits it 
provides. These issues will be addressed further below. 
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 It is useful to summarize the resulting structure of international 
taxation in the following table, which divides the world into two 
categories of taxpayers, resident and non-resident. For each category, 
there is a further division between active (business) and passive 
(investment) income. Active income is taxed primarily at source, while 
passive income is taxed primarily at residence: 
 
Table 1: The Structure of the International Tax Regime 
     WORLD 
   Residents   Non-residents 
  Active Passive    Active Passive 
  Low tax High tax  High Tax Low tax  
 
4. Current Challenges to the International Tax Regime. 
 
In parts 1-3 above, I laid out the thesis that an international tax 
regime exists and that it has a coherent structure based on two 
principles: the single tax principle (that all income should be subject to 
tax once, not twice or more and not less than once) and the benefits 
principle (that active income should be taxed primarily at source while 
passive income should be taxed primarily at residence). 
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While the benefits principle is broadly accepted as reflecting the 
consensus compromise reached under the auspices of the League of 
Nations in the 1920s (see Ault 1991, Graetz & O'Hear 1996), there is a 
debate on whether there exists an international tax regime (see 
Rosenbloom 2000, 2006) and in particular whether it incorporates a 
single tax principle (see Rosenbloom 2006). Whether preventing 
double non-taxation is an appropriate goal of international tax has 
been hotly debated, e.g., in the 2004 Vienna Congress of the 
International Fiscal Association. 
In this concluding part, I will survey three relatively recent 
developments that undermine the single tax principle: tax competition 
for passive income, tax competition for active income, and tax 
arbitrage. I will then discuss various reactions to these developments 
at both the national and supra-national levels (primarily through the 
OECD), and assess their success in curbing the threat to the single tax 
principle. Finally, I will discuss the implications of these reactions for 
the debate surrounding the existence of the international tax regime. 
In my opinion, these reactions prove that an increasing number of 
important tax administrations, as well as the OECD, believe in the 
single tax principle and seek to implement it in practice. 
 
a. Tax Competition for Passive Investment. 
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 Since the United States unilaterally abolished withholding on 
portfolio interest in 1984, there has been a distinct trend not to tax 
interest at source, which has spread to other forms of passive income 
such as capital gains, royalties, rents, and even dividends. I have 
explained elsewhere (Avi-Yonah, 1996) why a combination of officially 
sanctioned loopholes (such as the portfolio interest exemption), source 
rules (such as the rules for capital gains and for payments under 
derivative financial instruments), and treaty reductions have led to the 
United States not applying its withholding tax to almost all forms of 
passive investment income that economically derive from the US 
market. 
The lack of withholding tax combines with the existence of tax 
havens to make it almost impossible for residence countries to 
effectively tax passive income. In the absence of withholding tax, 
source countries have no interest in collecting information on 
payments of such income to non-residents. Tax havens have bank 
secrecy laws, and payments can be made to them from source country 
without any information collected that can be exchanged with the 
residence country under article 26 of the treaties. 
The result is widespread double non-taxation of investment 
income: no withholding at source, and no effective residence taxation 
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because of no effective exchange of information. It is hard to estimate 
how much tax is evaded in this way, but Vito Tanzi has estimated that 
as much as $7 trillion in interest income escape taxation (Tanzi, 
1996). For the US, there is an estimate of an annual revenue loss of 
$50 billion due to this type of evasion (Guttentag and Avi-Yonah, 
2005). 
However, since 1998 there have been a series of steps taken by 
residence countries to combat this phenomenon. This is reflected in 
steps taken at the OECD, the EU, and by national tax administrations. 
The OECD has addressed the problem of tax havens in its 1998 report 
on harmful tax competition and has exerted significant pressure on tax 
havens to allow effective exchange of information. It has also adopted 
a new, much stronger version of art. 26 in its model treaty, and has 
drafted a multilateral exchange of information treaty. The EU has 
adopted the savings directive, which requires member states to 
cooperate in ensuring that payments of interest and other forms of 
passive income from one member state to another be subject to either 
withholding or information reporting. And national tax administrations 
have concluded exchange of information agreements with an 
expanding number of tax havens. The US, for example, has such 
agreements with most of the Caribbean jurisdictions listed as tax 
havens by the OECD. The US is also cooperating in exchange of 
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information with the EU by forcing financial institutions to collect 
information on payments to the EU that are covered by the portfolio 
interest exemption. Even Switzerland has agreed to cooperate and 
relax its strict bank secrecy laws. 
I have expressed some doubts about whether these initiatives 
are working. In particular, the actual agreements reached with tax 
havens tend to fall short of the expanded version of article 26 
envisaged by the OECD. We still lack universal tax ID numbers to help 
tax administrations use the information that they get. And even one 
non-cooperating tax haven can defeat the whole effort if payments can 
be routed through it. That is why I still believe that a better solution is 
a coordinated withholding tax imposed by the OECD members (US, EU 
and Japan), and refundable upon a showing that the income has been 
declared to the residence country. After all, nobody can afford to leave 
their funds in tax havens; they must be invested in the OECD 
countries to earn a decent rate of return. 
However, the key point here is not whether the effort is 
succeeding, but that it is made. In my opinion, it is clear that in the 
view of all 30 members of the OECD (as well as all 25 members of the 
EU, which largely overlap with the OECD), the single tax principle is 
valid, and double non-taxation of passive income is not acceptable. 
Otherwise, they would not have reacted to the collapse of source-
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based taxation of such income after 1984 by trying so hard to tax it on 
a residence basis (where, in accordance with the benefits principle, it 
should be taxed). 
   
b. Tax Competition for Active Investment. 
 
As I have explained at length elsewhere (Avi-Yonah, 2000), tax 
competition for FDI has been growing steadily since about 1980 and 
now means that multinationals can hope to escape any tax on their 
cross-border income. Suppose a multinational is resident in country A, 
has its production facilities in country B, and sells its products in 
country C. Country C can only tax the MNE if it has a permanent 
establishment therein, and in the age of electronic commerce, that 
may be possible to avoid. Country B typically does not tax the MNE 
because it is a "production tax haven," i.e., a country that refrains 
from taxing production activities by MNEs while imposing a general 
corporate tax on domestic corporations. Country A also typically would 
not tax the resident MNE on a current basis because it is afraid of MNE 
headquarters migrating to other countries (either by inversion type 
transactions or by takeover by foreign MNEs) and of new MNEs being 
incorporated elsewhere. As a result, a MNE like Intel ends up paying 
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no tax at all on its foreign source income (and if it can deduct stock 
options, also on its US source income). 
The economic data show that this type of tax competition exists, 
although it tends to affect more the corporate tax revenues in 
developing countries (country B in the example) than the developed 
country (countries A and C) (Keen and Simone, 2004). The reason is 
that OECD countries have been reducing the PE threshold (LeGall, 
2006) and that it turns our that for most MNEs it is hard to avoid 
having a PE even in the age of e-commerce (Avi-Yonah, 1997 and 
2001). 
However, in this case also the OECD has been working hard to 
combat the tax competition phenomenon by putting pressure on both 
OECD members and non-members to abolish the production tax 
havens, as well as to abandon tax sparing rules in treaties that foster 
double non-taxation. In addition, the WTO has been pressuring 
developing countries to abandon production tax havens that amount to 
export subsidies, and many Latin American countries have in fact 
abandoned their production tax haven regimes in the Doha Round. 
Finally, countries have been taking steps to defend residence-based 
taxation of their MNEs by adopting or strengthening CFC rules (26 
countries now have such rules, which were pioneered by the US in 
1962) and combating inversion transactions (e.g., IRC 7874). 
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Again, the main point is not whether these efforts have been 
successful, although at least for OECD members they seem to have 
stopped the erosion of the corporate tax base that was evident in the 
1990s. The main point is that by adopting such measures, OECD 
members (as well as the WTO) show that they do not believe in double 
non-taxation of active income and are trying to protect the taxation of 
such income at source (with residual taxation by the residence country 
if there is no taxation at source). I believe this trend will continue until 
effective residence-based taxation by OECD members stops developing 
countries from engaging in harmful tax competition. 
 
c. Tax Arbitrage. 
 
Tax arbitrage can be defined as transactions that are designed to 
take advantage of differences between national tax systems to achieve 
double non-taxation. Thus, tax arbitrage directly negates the single 
tax principle. 
There is no question that Rosenbloom is correct in his assertion 
that countries did not always care about tax arbitrage. The first US tax 
treaty was with France in 1937, when France was purely territorial, so 
the US reduced its tax at source in the knowledge that the income will 
not be taxed at residence. 
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But I believe that developments since 1984 show that the US as 
well as other OECD member countries have reached a consensus that 
rejects tax arbitrage. In 1984, the US terminated its treaty with the 
Netherlands Antilles on the ground that it should not have treaties with 
countries that do not tax on a residence basis. Since then, it has been 
clear that the US will not enter into treaties with tax havens, and that 
it views reductions in source-based taxation as premised upon the 
income being taxed by the state of residence. That is why the US 
insists since 1986 on limitation on benefits rules in all its tax treaties, 
which are designed to prevent reductions in source taxation benefiting 
non-treaty country residents precisely because such non-treaty 
residents may not be taxable on a residence basis. Domestically, this 
rule has been bolstered by court cases and by regulations against the 
use of conduits to achieve treaty benefits. It has also been adopted by 
the OECD through changes to the commentary to art. 1 of the OECD 
model. 
The negative attitude of the US to tax arbitrage and double non-
taxation is also evident outside the treaty context. Also in 1984, the 
US adopted the dual consolidated loss rule, which is designed to 
prevent a taxpayer from using one economic loss in two taxing 
jurisdictions. As Rosenbloom (2000) admits, this rule (which has 
recently been expanded in regulations) makes no sense unless the US 
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believes that double non-taxation is bad. In the 1990s, the US took a 
series of steps to combat specific tax arbitrage transactions based on 
check the box, such as IRS section 894© (the reverse hybrid rule) and 
Notices 98-5 and 98-11. While the specific notices were later 
withdrawn, the Bush administration continues to fight tax arbitrage, as 
evidenced by recent regulations on tax arbitrage transactions involving 
the foreign tax credit (Reich, 2006, Peaslee 2006). 
The same negative view toward tax arbitrage can be seen in 
other countries. A recent article in the International Tax Review (2006) 
lists new anti-tax arbitrage rules being adopted recently in Australia, 
Canada, Japan, the UK, and even Ireland (with a corporate tax rate of 
only 12.5%) has adopted such rules in 2006. The UK rules are 
particularly comprehensive and have drawn bitter complaints from tax 
practitioners, to no avail. 
Rosenbloom (2006) writes that although an international tax 
regime may exist, and although tax treaties can be regarded as a 
"closed" system that condition reductions in source taxation on 
taxation by the residence country, the single tax principle is still a 
mirage: "At the level of specific rules, however, there is no mechanism 
for enforcing, or even attempting to enforce, either the benefits 
principle or the single tax principle… At the level of individual 
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transactions, in fact, it is hard to discern the existence of any 
international tax regime at all." 
Rosenbloom may be right about that- as a practitioner 
specializing in tax arbitrage transactions, he should know. But at the 
policy level, I disagree with his view that "an effort to foreclose cross-
border arbitrage opportunities is not and should not be a first-rank 
policy objective of the United States." We can argue about that "should 
not", and that is the point of the earlier debate we had on this topic 
(Rosenbloom 2000, Avi-Yonah 2000). But in face of the accumulating 
evidence to the contrary, it seems to me hard to argue about the "is 
not": Both the US, and other OECD member countries, are in fact 
concerned about tax arbitrage and by extension about double non-
taxation, both in the treaty context and outside it. 
 
d. Conclusion. 
This article has attempted to describe the contours of the 
international tax regime. I have tried to show that such a regime 
exists and that it is based on the single tax and benefits principles. 
Moreover, I believe the regime, both through treaties and through 
actual practice, can be regarded as part of customary international 
law. Whether or not that last conclusion is valid, it is hard to argue 
with the proposition that all countries, even the United States, face 
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significant practical difficulties in attempting to depart from the 
international tax regime. 
If the above is true, I believe that we can do better. In 
particular, it would help if countries explicitly articulated that they are 
trying to adhere to the single tax and benefits principle, and take 
those principles into account in drafting their tax laws. Moreover, the 
OECD should take these principles more explicitly into consideration in 
revising its model treaty, and revise the model so that it functions 
better to prevent both double taxation and double non-taxation. But 
that is a topic for another day (Avi-Yonah, Schoen and Vann, 
forthcoming). 
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